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Notes and Comments
NLRB v. Yeshiva University: The
Professional-Managerial Overlap
By Susan Grody*
In National Labor Relations Board v. Yeshiva University,1
the United States Supreme Court held that the full-time faculty
members of Yeshiva University were not entitled to the protection
of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).2 Based upon a re-
view of the Yeshiva faculty's authority within the University, the
Court concluded that the faculty members were managerial em-
ployees in addition to their status as "professionals," 3 and thus
excluded from NLRA protection under the Court's holding in
NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co.
4
This Note reconsiders Bell in light of Yeshiva and determines
that Bell's mandate of excluding all managers from NLRA protec-
tion is overbroad. The Note examines Yeshiva's effect upon statu-
tory protection of professionals under section 2(12) of the NLRA5
and determines that Yeshiva reduces it scope. In addition, the
Note analyzes the impact that Bell and Yeshiva may have upon
the collective bargaining rights of other university faculties and
other professional groups. As an illustration of the potentially
broad sweep of the decisions, the possible effect upon symphony
* B.F.A., 1977, State University of New York at Purchase. Member, Second Year Class.
1. 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976 & Supp. II 1978) (commonly known as the Wagner Act).
The NLRA protects employees from unfair labor practices. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-158 (1976).
See generally R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW (1976); THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW
(C. Morris ed. 1971).
3. Professionals are afforded NLRA protection under 29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (1976). See
note 65 infra.
4. 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (1976).
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orchestra unionization is discussed. The Note concludes that un-
less limited by the Court in the future, Bell and Yeshiva are likely
to have a damaging impact upon a variety of collective bargaining
relationships. The Note recommends that the National Labor Re-
lations Board (NLRB) and the courts develop a more precise stan-
dard to delineate the managerial exclusion in order to ensure that
the individuals falling within its confines are excluded from NLRA
protection only when the policies underlying the Act require such
exclusion.
NLRB Jurisdiction Over Higher Education
In 1951, the NLRB declined to assert jurisdiction over labor-
management relations at private institutions6 of higher education.7
At that time the Board noted that private institutions of higher
education might have a sufficient effect upon interstate commerce
to justify federal jurisdiction over labor disputes at such institu-
tions." However, the noncommercial nature of the activities affect-
ing commerce influenced the Board to decline jurisdiction.,
In 1970, unions representing nonacademic employees of Cor-
nell University and Syracuse University petitioned the Board for
bargaining unit certification. The Board expressly overruled its
1951 holding and agreed to assert jurisdiction over private institu-
tions of higher education.10 Enrollments at colleges and universi-
ties had increased considerably in the 1950's and 1960's,11 account-
ing in part for the Board's determination that private colleges and
6. The NLRB has no jurisdiction over public higher education because state universi-
ties and colleges are chartered by their respective state governments. State governments are
not considered "employers" under the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976). See generally
Note, Conflicting Approaches to the Scope of Mandatory Bargaining in Public University
Faculty Employment: Central Michigan University Faculty Association v. Central Michi-
gan University, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1139 (1980).
7. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 97 N.L.R.B. 424 (1951).
8. The NLRA empowers the NLRB "to prevent any person from engaging in any un-
fair labor practice ... affecting commerce." 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
The NLRA allows the Board to decline jurisdiction when the Board feels the effect on com-
merce is not "sufficiently substantial" to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction. Id. §
164(c)(1). The NLRA defines "commerce" as interstate commerce. Id. § 152(6).
9. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 97 N.L.R.B. 424, 427 (1951).
10. Cornell Univ., 183 N.L.R.B. 329 (1970). The Board's language in asserting jurisdic-
tion was broad enough to apply to academic employees, as well, in future cases. Id. at 334.
See generally 29 U.S.C. § 164(c) (1976).
11. See generally Garbarino, Emergence of Collective Bargaining, in FACULTY UNIONS
AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 1 (E. Duryea & R. Fisk eds. 1973).
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universities had sufficient effect upon interstate commerce to jus-
tify the exercise of the Board's discretionary power. 2 However, the
Board emphasized that the effect must be "substantial" to be ju-
risdictionally sufficient."8
In 1971, the administration of C. W. Post Center of Long Is-
land University asserted that the NLRB's jurisdiction over private
universities did not extend to private university faculty mem-
bers.14 The administration also argued that the faculty at private
colleges and universities act as "supervisors" and "managers,"
categories of employees excluded from NLRA protection. 5
The Board rejected both arguments presented in C. W. Post,
finding that the faculty members were neither supervisors nor
managers, because the faculty exercised authority collectively
through faculty committees rather than as individuals.' 6 From
1971 through 1975, six more university administrations presented
the C. W. Post arguments before the Board.1 Each time, the
12. The Board noted that "revenues of private institutions of higher education for
fiscal year 1966-67 totaled over $6 billion" and that "[e]xpenditures to operate and maintain
these academic communities necessarily include purchases of food, furniture, office equip-
ment, supplies, utilities, and the like, much of which is obtained through the channels of
interstate commerce." 183 N.L.R.B. at 332. The Board also noted "the expanded role of the
Federal Government in higher education" and the inadequacy of state collective bargaining
laws. Id. at 333-34.
13. Subsequent to Cornell, the Board, in a rare exercise of its rulemaking powers, de-
termined that an institution of higher education is presumed to have a substantial effect
upon interstate commerce if the institution's annual gross revenues are at least $1,000,000.
29 C.F.R. § 103.1 (1979). "The Board, in fixing its 'jurisdictional amount' limitation, seeks to
confine its caseload to manageable proportions but at the same time to extend its protec-
tions to as many employers and employees as possible." Pollitt & Thompson, Collective
Bargaining on the Campus: A Survey Five Years After Cornell, 1 INDUS. REL. L.J. 191, 199
n.53 (1976). The Board estimated that the $1,000,000 standard would extend protection to
80% of all private colleges and universities. 35 Fed. Reg. 18,370, 18,371 (1970). A discussion
of the NLRB's rulemaking powers is beyond the scope of this Note. See generally Bern-
stein, The NLRB's Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma Under the Administrative Proce-
dure Act, 79 YALE L.J. 571 (1970); Kahn, The NLRB and Higher Education: The Failure of
Policymaking Through Adjudication, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 63 (1973); Peck, A Critique of the
National Labor Relations Board's Performance in Policy Formulation: Adjudication and
Rule-Making, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 254 (1968); Note, NLRB Rulemaking: Political Reality
Versus Procedural Fairness, 89 YALE. L.J. 982 (1980).
14. C.W. Post Center of Long Island Univ., 189 N.L.R.B. 904 (1971).
15. Id. at 904-05. See notes 19-45 & accompanying text infra.
16. 189 N.L.R.B. at 905.
17. See Northeastern Univ., 218 N.L.R.B. 247 (1975); University of Miami, 213
N.L.R.B. 634 (1974); New York Univ., 205 N.L.R.B. 4 (1973); Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B.
639 (1972); Manhattan College, 195 N.L.R.B. 65 (1972); Fordham Univ., 193 N.L.R.B. 134
(1971). See generally Pollitt & Thompson, Collective Bargaining on the Campus: A Survey
Five Years After Cornell, 1 INDus. REL. L.J. 191 (1976).
NLRB v. YESHIVA UNIVERSITYJanuary 1981]
Board rejected the claims and reaffirmed what had become known
as the "collective authority" doctrine of C. W. Post.
18
Exclusion from NLRA Protection
Personnel acting in the capacity of "supervisors" or "man-
agers" are excluded from NLRA protection. The supervisory and
managerial exclusions, although similar, are analytically distinct.
Supervisory personnel are excluded by statute, 9 whereas manage-
rial personnel are excluded by judicial and administrative con-
struction.20 One of the critical provisions of the 1947 Taft-Hartley
amendments to the NLRA was the exclusion of supervisors from
NLRA protection.2 1 This exclusion was a response to the Supreme
Court's affirmance of the Board's decision in Packard Motor Car
18. See note 16 & accompanying text supra.
19. Supervisors are excluded from NLRA protection by an indirect method. 29 U.S.C.
§ 164(a) (1976) states: "Nothing herein shall prohibit any individual employed as a super-
visor from becoming or remaining a member of a labor organization, but no employer sub-
ject to this subchapter shall be compelled to deem individuals defined herein as supervisors
as employees for the purpose of any law, either national or local, relating to collective bar-
gaining." Thus, a supervisor would have no legal redress if dismissed by the employer be-
cause of union participation. As defined by the NLRA, a supervisor is "any individual hav-
ing authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall,
promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibility to direct
them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection
with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature,
but requires the use of independent judgment." Id. § 152(11). Courts consistently have in-
terpreted § 152(11) to provide that an individual who has authority to perform any one of
the listed duties qualifies as a supervisor. See, e.g., Amalgamated Local Union 355 v. NLRB,
481 F.2d 996 (2d Cir. 1973); Ohio Power Co. v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 385 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
338 U.S. 899 (1949). See generally Finkin, The Supervisory Status of Professional Employ-
ees, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 805 (1977); Comment, University of Chicago v. National Labor
Relations Board, 6 CHi. Loy. U.L.J. 756 (1976); Comment, The Status of Supervisors Under
the National Labor Relations Act, 35 LA. L. REV. 800 (1976). For a discussion of the super-
visory exclusion as it relates to collective bargaining in higher education, see Finkin, The
NLRB in Higher Education, U. TOL. L. REV. 608 (1974); Kahn, The NLRB and Higher
Education: The Failure of Policymaking Through Adjudication, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 63
(1973); Moore, The Determination of Bargaining Units for College Faculties, 37 U. Prrr. L.
REV. 43 (1975); McHugh, Collective Bargaining with Professionals in Higher Education:
Problems in Unit Determinations, 1971 Wis. L. REV. 55; Pollit & Thompson, Collective
Bargaining on the Campus: A Survey Five Years After Cornell, 1 INDUS. REL. L.J. 191
(1976); Note, The Appropriate Faculty Bargaining Unit in Private Colleges and Universi-
ties, 59 VA. L. REv. 492 (1973).
20. See notes 24-45 & accompanying text infra.
21. 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(11), 164(a) (1976). The Taft-Hartley amendments are also known
as the Labor Management Relations Act.
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Co.,22 which involved a bargaining group certification of a unit of
foremen. Congress apparently agreed with Justice Douglas' dissent
in Packard that "[t]he present decision. . tends to obliterate the
line between management and labor,"23 and therefore amended the
NLRA to exclude supervisors.
Despite the close conceptual relationship between the super-
visory and managerial exclusions, nowhere in the 1,680 page legis-
lative history of the Taft-Hartley amendments is the managerial
exclusion expressly discussed.24 Rather, the Board's policy of
excluding managerial personnel from rank-and-file bargaining
units dates from the first two years of the Board's activity after its
creation under the Wagner Act of 1935.25 Managerial personnel
were excluded from rank-and-file units because they lacked a
"community of interest" with the rank-and-file workers.28 Thus, in
Dravo Corp.,27 the Board excluded buyers and expediters from a
unit of clerical employees. The Board reserved determination on
the question of whether the buyers and expediters should be al-
lowed to organize in a separate unit: "This is not to say, however,
that buyers and expediters are to be denied the right to self-organ-
ization and to collective bargaining under the Act. '28 In 1946 in
Ford Motor Co., 29 the Board defined managers as those "who are
in a position to formulate, determine, and effectuate management
policy."30 That definition received consistent approval from the
lower courts.3 1 Essentially adopting the position taken by the lower
courts, the Supreme Court adopted this definition in its 1974 deci-
sion in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co.
3 2
22. 61 N.L.R.B. 4 (1945), enforced, 157 F.2d 80 (6th Cir. 1946), afl'd, 330 U.S. 485
(1947).
23. Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 494 (1947) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
24. See H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT 1947 (1948).
25. 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1976).
26. See 2 NLRB ANN. REP. 131, 136-37 (1937).
27. 54 N.L.R.B. 1174 (1944).
28. Id. at 1177.
29. 66 N.L.R.B. 1317 (1946).
30. Id. at 1322.
31. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 1151, 1158 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970); Illinois State Journal-Register, Inc. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 37, 41
(7th Cir. 1969); Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. NLRB, 366 F.2d 642, 644-45 (D.C. Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1017 (1967).
32. 416 U.S. 267, 288 (1974).
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Bell is also significant for having laid to rest a nascent Board
concept that only those managers whose union membership "would
create a conflict of interest with their job responsibilities" were to
be excluded from NLRA protection." The Court held that the
Board's earlier interpretation of the statute, excluding all man-
agers from NLRA protection, was correct and must be followed.
The Court thus implicitly approved the Board's 1956 decision in
Swift & Co.,34 which had involved the representation of a unit of
purchasing agents who had the power to commit the employer's
credit. In Swift the Board held that the purchasing agents could
not be incorporated into a unit of production and maintenance em-
ployees, and that the purchasing agents could not separately or-
ganize. The Board made the sweeping statement that "[i]t was the
clear intent of Congress to exclude from the coverage of the Act all
individuals allied with management. Such individuals cannot be
deemed to be employees for the purposes of the Act."3"
In 1970, the Board reconsidered and expressly overruled Swift
in North Arkansas Electric Cooperative, Inc.36 North Arkansas
concerned the status of an "electrification advisor" who had been
fired for participating in a union election campaign. The Board
originally held that the employer was guilty of an unfair labor
practice3 7 because the employee was not managerial and therefore
was entitled to the protection of the Act. The Eighth Circuit re-
versed, expressly holding that the employee was managerial.38
However, the court remanded to the Board the general question of
whether managerial employees are protected by the Act.3 On re-
33. Id. at 269. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 1151, 1158 (7th
Cir. 1970); Illinois State Journal-Register, Inc. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 37, 41 (7th Cir. 1969).
The Court further held that the NLRB is not required to proceed by rulemaking when
effecting a change in Board policy. At issue was the Board's ability to adjudicate whether
certain buyers in the Bell Aerospace Company who had the power to commit the company's
credit were "managerial." The Second Circuit held, in accord with SEC' v. Chenery
Corp.(Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947), that when the Board contemplates a major
policy change, "[tihe function of filling in the interstices of the Act should be performed" by
rulemaking rather than by adjudication. Bell Aerospace Co. v. NLRB, 475 F.2d 485, 495 (2d
Cir. 1973). The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals on this issue. 416 U.S. at 290-
95. See note 13 supra.
34. 115 N.L.R.B. 752 (1956).
35. Id. at 753-54 (footnotes omitted).
36. 185 N.L.R.B. 550 (1970), enforcement denied, 446 F.2d 602 (8th Cir. 1971).
37. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976).
38. 412 F.2d 324, 328 (8th Cir. 1969).
39. Id.
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mand, the Board made a determination that was eventually to re-
surface as the crux of the Bell controversy. The Board stated that
"there is nothing in the record to suggest that [the electrification
advisor] participated in the formulation, determination, or effectu-
ation of policy with respect to employee relations matters ....
[Furthermore, there is nothing] in this record to suggest an incon-
sistency or conflict of interest between proper performance of his
job and the implementation of his right to engage in or refrain
from engaging in concerted activity. '40 The Board thus held that
although a managerial employee could be excluded from a bargain-
ing unit under section 159(b) of the NLRA on the basis of a lack of
a community of interest with the other members of the unit, the
managerial employee was still entitled to protection from unfair
labor practices under section 152(3) of the Act unless the manage-
rial employee's membership in a bargaining unit would create a
conflict of interest with the employee's job responsibilities. Be-
cause the Board found that the electrification advisor's member-
ship in the bargaining unit would not create a conflict of interest
with his job responsibilities, it held that he was entitled to protec-
tion from unfair labor practices. However, the Eighth Circuit again
denied enforcement of the Board's determination, rejecting the
"conflict of interest" test and holding that no managerial employ-
ees were protected by section 152(3) of the Act.41
On the same day the Eighth Circuit reversed the Board's sec-
ond North Arkansas decision, the Board certified a unit of buyers
at the Bell Aerospace Company.42 Bell, the employer, had opposed
the buyers' petition for certification on the grounds that the buyers
were managerial employees. In light of the Eighth Circuit's rever-
sal of the Board's North Arkansas orders, Bell's administration
asked the Board for reconsideration of the certification decision.
The Board, however, refused to reconsider, indicating that it dis-
agreed with the Eighth Circuit's holding.43 Bell then refused to
bargain with the newly certified unit of buyers, and the Board
sought enforcement in the Second Circuit. Judge Friendly, writing
for the court, denied enforcement and agreed with the Eighth Cir-
40. 185 N.L.R.B. 550, 550-51 (1970) (emphasis in original), enforcement denied, 446
F.2d 602 (8th Cir. 1971).
41. NLRB v. North Ark. Elec. Coop., Inc., 446 F.2d 602 (8th Cir. 1971).
42. Bell Aerospace Co., 196 N.L.R.B. 827 (1972).
43. Id. at 827-28. The Board was free to ignore the Eighth Circuit's North Arkansas
holdings because Bell was in the Second Circuit.
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cuit in rejecting the "conflict of interest" test and in holding that
no managers are employees within the meaning of section 152(3) of
the Act.44 The Supreme Court affirmed on this issue."
The Agency and Court Holdings In Yeshiva
The NLRB Holding
In 1974, the Yeshiva University Faculty Association filed a pe-
tition"' with the NLRB for certification of a bargaining unit con-
sisting of the full-time facUlty47 at the University.48 The University
administration opposed the petition and urged the Board to recon-
sider its ruling in C. W. Post,49 arguing that the "collective author-
ity" doctrine 0 was unsound and that "all faculty members ... are
supervisory or managerial and are, thereby, not employees within
the meaning of the Act."51 The administration also attempted to
distinguish C. W. Post on the facts, arguing that the faculty at
Yeshiva exercised more extensive authority than did the faculty at
C. W. Post.52
The NLRB granted certification to the bargaining unit pro-
posed by the Faculty Association, 3 but the University administra-
tion refused to bargain with the certified faculty union. The union
therefore filed an unfair labor practice charge 54 with the Board. In
response, the Board filed a complaint against the University in an
44. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 475 F.2d 485, 494 (2d Cir. 1973).
45. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 289 (1974). See generally Comment,
Will the Real Managerial Employees Please Stand Up?, 9 Loy. OF L.A.L. REv. 92 (1975).
46. The petition was filed pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 159(e) (1976).
47. The unit consisted of assistant deans, senior professors, department chairpersons,
associate professors, assistant professors, and instructors. The unit did not include deans
and directors. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 678 (1980).
48. At the time the petition was filed, Yeshiva University comprised 13 schools in New
York City. The union sought to represent 10 of these schools. Id. at 674-75.
49. See notes 14-16 & accompanying text supra.
50. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
51. Yeshiva Univ., 221 N.L.R.B. 1053, 1054 (1975).
52. Id. at 1054.
53. The bargaining unit sought by the Faculty Association was found appropriate by
the Board with one exception: faculty members administering grants under government
awards or awards from private agencies were excluded from the unit because such faculty
members were supervisors under the Act. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 582 F.2d 686, 689 n.2 (2d
Cir. 1978). See note 19 supra.
54. The NLRA states that it is an "unfair labor practice" for an employer to refuse to
bargain collectively with the Board-certified representative of the employees. 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(5) (1976).
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effort to enforce the union certification ruling. The University de-
fended on the grounds that the NLRB unit determination was in-
valid.5 The Board, however, rejected the University's position and
found that the University's refusal to bargain with the union was a
violation of the NLRA5
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, finding
that the Yeshiva faculty members did "formulate, determine, and
effectuate" 57 their employer's policies and thus were managers.
The court followed the Bell rule excluding all managers from
NLRA protection.58 Because the court held that the professors
could be excluded from NLRA protection as managers, it did not
address the University's claim that the professors were also
59
supervisors.e
The appellate court divided its analysis into four sections,
based upon assertions made in the Board's holding.60 The Board
had asserted that the full-time faculty members were professional
employees;61 that they acted collectively; 2 that they acted on their
55. 221 N.L.R.B. at 1054.
56. Id. See note 54 supra.
57. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 582 F.2d 686, 695 (2d Cir. 1978). The appellate court
attributed the managerial definition to Retail Clerks Int'l Assoc. v. NLRB, 366 F.2d 642, 645
(D.C. Cir. 1966).
58. See notes 33-45 & accompanying text supra.
59. 582 F.2d at 702-03.
60. See 221 N.L.R.B. at 1054.
61. A critical provision of the Taft-Hartley amendments specifically includes profes-
sionals under NLRA protection. 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(12), 157 (1976 & Supp. II 1978). The
inclusion of this provision was hotly contested in both the House and the Senate. See, e.g.,
Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act: Hearings Before the House Comm. on
Education and Labor, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 1225 (1947) (statement of Howard I. Young);
Labor Relations Program: Hearings on S. 55 & S.J. Res. 22 Before Senate Comm. on Labor
and Public Welfare, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 694 (1947) (testimony of Charles R. Kuzell). See
generally H. MILLIS & E. BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER ACT To TAFT-HARTLEY (1950).
In Yeshiva, the Board contended in its appellate brief that the faculty members were
professionals protected by the Act, and not supervisors or managers. The Board argued:
"The weight and respect accorded the faculty's views in the areas of their expertise is a
function of their professional standing, independent of their position in the governing struc-
ture of the University. Whatever input the faculty may have in areas of University govern-
ance, such as personnel and budget, similarly arises from their professional concern with the
academic quality of the institution . . . . Conferring managerial status upon such profes-
sional employees 'would eviscerate the traditional distinction between labor and manage-
ment.'" Brief for Appellant at 23, NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 582 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1978)
(quoting General Dynamics Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 851, 858 (1974)). The court of appeals did
not agree: "The issue as we perceive it in this case involves not simply the professor's exer-
cise of discretion in conducting the courses he is employed to teach. Rather, the issue here is
the extensive control of Yeshiva's faculty over what courses are taught in the institution,
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own behalf and not in the interest of the employer; 63 and that they
who teaches them, the number of teaching hours required of the faculty, and the rank, sal-
ary, and tenure status of other faculty members. We are further concerned by the crucial
role of the full-time faculty in determining other central policies of the institution including
inter alia, the curriculum, admissions and graduation requirements, tuition, and in one in-
stance, even the situs of a school. When faculty members have such power-as the record
indicates they do at Yeshiva-they no longer are simply exercising individual professional
expertise. They are, in effect, substantially and pervasively operating the enterprise." 582
F.2d at 698. The court was referring to an incident in which the Yeshiva administration
deferred to the faculty's recommendation that the Teacher's Institute not be moved from
Manhattan to Brooklyn. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 677 n.6 (1980).
62. 582 F.2d at 698. The court declared that the Board's "collective authority" doc-
trine was irrelevant to a finding of managerial status. This was because Bell, from which the
judicial definition of manager was derived, involved a fact situation in which "the bargain-
ing unit exercised their managerial functions as a 'team.'" Id. at 699 (citing NLRB v. Bell
Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 270 (1974)). Therefore, because the Supreme Court had found
that managerial status could be applied to a "team," the fact that the Yeshiva faculty acted
collectively was not significant. However, the court conceded that the "collective authority"
doctrine did merit discussion with regard to the question of supervisory status. The court
noted that § 2(11) of the NLRA refers to "'an individual' who possesses the enumerated
indicia of supervision. Since the control here in issue is not of individual faculty member
over nonprofessionals, but the collective control exercised by the faculty either in concert,
through department chairmen, or through faculty dominated committees, it must be con-
ceded that if read literally the statutory definition can be construed not to cover the full-
time faculty." 582 F.2d at 698-99. However, the court also reasoned that this strict interpre-
tation was not "the only reasonable reading of the language of section 2(11)." Id. at 699.
The court stated that a "realistic interpretation" of § 2(11) would include supervisory au-
thority exercised collectively because "group action is so frequently encountered in modern
corporate decision making." Id. The court pointed out that the Board itself had made deci-
sions wherein supervisory authority was found notwithstanding its collective basis. See, e.g.,
Florida Southern College, 196 N.L.R.B. 888, 889 (1972); Western Saw Manufacturers, Inc.,
155 N.L.R.B. 1323, 1329 n.11 (1965).
The court further attacked the "collective authority" doctrine by tracing its origins in
Board decisions. "When the Board first announced this view in C.W. Post Center of Long
Island University . . .it did so without benefit of analysis, and without citation to perti-
nent administrative decisions, judicial precedents or legislative history." 582 F.2d at 698
n.14. The court made its own search of the legislative history of the Act and found nothing
to support the Board's "collective authority" doctrine. Id. at 699. See generally Bethel, Pri-
vate University Professors and NLRB v. Yeshiva: The Second Circuit's Misconception of
Shared Authority and Supervisory Status, 44 Mo. L. REv. 427 (1979).
63. 582 F.2d at 700. The court rejected the Board's theory that the faculty members
acted on their own behalf rather than in the interest of the university administration, argu-
ing that the "interests of the faculty and of the University were almost always co-extensive."
Id. The record showed that the administration and the Board of Trustees rarely reversed
faculty recommendations. Id. The court agreed with the testimony of Director Faivelson,
that with regard to the Teacher's Institute, "Itihe faculty is the school." Id. Even if the
Yeshiva faculty had acted in its own behalf (which the court reasoned it had not), "the
University has accepted those decisions without hesitation so consistently that the Board's
attempt to dichotomize those interests results in a strained, artificial separation." Id. at 701.
The court quoted Kenneth Kahn, a writer well known for his criticism of the NLRB's asser-
tion of jurisdiction over higher education, to the effect that faculties and administrations
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were not managerial or supervisory because they were subject to
the ultimate authority of the Board of Trustees. 4
The court agreed with only the first of the four propositions,
that the faculty members were professional employees as defined
by section 2(12) of the NLRA 5 This alone was not sufficient to
preclude a finding of managerial status because although profes-
sional employees are protected by the NLRA under section 7,66 su-
pervisors 67 and managers" are excluded from the Act's protection.
The court noted that the Board's own decisions established that
classification as a professional under section 2(12)9 "does not pre-
clude . . classification as supervisory or managerial personnel.
'70
have common goals. Id. at 700-01. See Kahn, The NLRB and Higher Education: The Fail-
ure of Policymaking Through Adjudication, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 63 (1973).
64. 582 F.2d at 701. The court found this final Board argument "particularly uncon-
vincing." Id. The court made the industrial analogy that all corporations are governed by a
Board of Directors, but that such governance does not preclude a finding of managerial or
supervisory status among executives of the corporations. Id. The court pointed out that
§ 2(11) includes in its definition of a supervisor one who has the power "effectively to rec-
ommend." Id. See note 19 supra. This, the court reasoned, proved that the Act itself envi-
sioned "a review by some higher authority." 582 F.2d at 702. See also Ferguson, Bergan &
Braff, Labor Board Jurisdictional and Unit Determinations, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN
HIGHER EDUCATION-THE DEVELOPING LAW 185-86 (1975). The court agreed with the Board
that "the Board's factual findings as to employee status are entitled to great weight and are
not lightly set aside." 582 F.2d at 702. However, the court found that in this case, the Board
had applied "unjustified, arbitrary standards." Id. at 703.
65. "The term 'professional employee' means (a) any employee engaged in work (i)
predominantly intellectual and varied in character as opposed to routine mental, manual,
mechanical, or physical work; (ii) involving the consistent exercise of discretion and judg-
ment in its performance; (iii) of such a character that the output produced or the result
accomplished cannot be standardized in relation to a given period of time; (iv) requiring
knowledge of an advanced type in a field of science or learning customarily acquired by a
prolonged course of specialized intellectualized instruction and study in an institution of
higher learning or a hospital, as distinguished from a general academic education or from an
apprenticeship or from training in the performance of routine mental, manual, or physical
processes." 29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (1976) (emphasis added).
66. "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection. . . " Id. § 157.
67. See note 19 supra.
68. See notes 20, 24-45 & accompanying text supra.
69. 29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (1976). See note 65 supra.
70. 582 F.2d at 697. See, e.g., General Dynamics Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 851, 860, 862-863
(1974); American Oil Co., 155 N.L.R.B. 46, 48-49 (1965); Puget Sound Power & Light Co.,
117 N.L.R.B. 1825, 1827 (1957).
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The United States Supreme Court Holding
The Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit opinion.7' In
a five to four decision written by Justice Powell, the majority
found that Yeshiva's full-time faculty members were managers
under the Bell definition72 and therefore were excluded from
NLRA protection. The Court agreed with the Second Circuit that
because the faculty could be so excluded it was unnecessary to re-
solve the issue of the faculty's supervisory status.
73
The Yeshiva Court augmented the Bell managerial definition
by extrapolating two additional criteria from the Bell opinion. In
addition to the Bell standard that managers "formulate and effec-
tuate management policies by expressing and making operative the
decisions of their employer, '7 4 the Yeshiva Court stated that
managers must also "exercise discretion within, or even indepen-
dently of, established employer policy and must be aligned with
management.
'75
The Board argued before the Court that the Yeshiva faculty
members were not managers "because they are expected to exer-
cise 'independent professional judgment' while participating in ac-
71. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
72. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
73. 444 U.S. at 682.
74. See text accompanying note 30 supra. In both Bell and Yeshiva, the Court derived
its managerial definition from Palace Laundry Dry Cleaning, 75 N.L.R.B. 320, 323 n.4
(1947), which had omitted the word "determine" from the Ford Motor Co., 66 N.L.R.B.
1317, 1322 (1946), definition; however, this omission does not appear to have any substan-
tive effect.
75. 444 U.S. at 683 (citing NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 286-87 (1974))
(emphasis added). An examination of the dictum in Bell that became the second section of
the Yeshiva managerial definition shows that the Yeshiva Court made an alteration to the
Bell dictum. The Bell dictum that became the second criterion of the Yeshiva test is cited
by the Bell Court as deriving from Eastern Camera & Photo Corp., 140 N.L.R.B. 569, 57L
(1963). However, the Yeshiva Court essentially misquoted the Bell Court's accurate quota-
tion from Eastern Camera. Eastern Camera actually stated that managers are "those who
have discretion in the performance of their jobs ... although even the authority to exercise
considerable discretion does not render an employee managerial where his decision must
conform to the employer's established policy." 140 N.L.R.B. at 571 (emphasis added). The
Yeshiva Court thus widened the scope of the managerial exclusion from what was intended
in Bell and Eastern Camera. This Note will hereinafter refer to Yeshiva's three-part mana-
gerial definition as the "Yeshiva-Bell test." It should be noted that the Yeshiva-Bell test is
presented in Yeshiva as being conjunctive in nature, whereas the statutory supervisory ex-
clusion is applied disjunctively. See note 19 supra.
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ademic governance. "76 The Yeshiva Court rejected this argument,
noting that the "independent professional judgment" test was a
thinly disguised revival of the Board's assertion at the appellate
level that the faculty acts on its own behalf rather than on behalf
of its employer.77 The Court agreed with the Second Circuit that
the faculty's interests and the University's interests cannot be sep-
arated. The majority reasoned that the Board's "independent pro-
fessional judgment" test erroneously assumes that the faculty can-
not "simultaneously be aligned" with its own professional interests
and "the interests of the institution.
'7 8
The Court further attacked the "independent professional
judgment" test because the majority determined that this ap-
proach encourages the faculty to divide its loyalty between the
union and the University. The test therefore directly obviated the
judicial objective of excluding managers from NLRA protection,
ensuring that "an employer is entitled to the undivided loyalty of
its representatives. 79 This "problem of divided loyalty," the Court
stated, "is particularly acute for a university like Yeshiva, which
depends on the professional judgment of its faculty to formulate
and apply crucial policies . . . .o
The Court noted that it is difficult to apply the NLRA to
higher education because the Act is based upon an industrial
model. Although agreeing with the Board "that principles devel-
oped for use in the industrial setting cannot be 'imposed blindly on
the academic world,' -81 the Court disagreed with the Board's con-
tention that the Board's findings deserved deference because of its
76. 444 U.S. at 684.
77. Id. at 684-85. See note 63 & accompanying text supra. The Court pointed out that
the "independent professional judgment" test was introduced by the Board at the Supreme
Court level and therefore was not part of the reviewable record. It was neither clearly estab-
lished in previous cases nor applied in the lower court proceedings in Yeshiva. 444 U.S. at
684-85.
78. 444 U.S. at 688. The Court also noted that the Board had not suggested that this
"independent professional judgment" test be limited to university faculty. Because previous
Board decisions in the industrial sector had "applied the managerial and supervisory exclu-
sions to professionals in executive positions without inquiring whether their decisions were
based on management policy rather than professional expertise . . . [this] new approach
would overrule sub silentio this body of Board precedent and could result in the indiscrimi-
nate recharacterization as covered employees of professionals working in supervisory and
managerial capacities." Id. at 687.
79. Id. at 682. See generally Note, Collective Bargaining-Faculty Status under the
National Labor Relations Act-NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 54 WASH. L. REv. 843 (1979).
80. 444 U.S. at 689.
81. Id. at 681 (quoting Syracuse Univ., 204 N.L.R.B. 641, 643 (1973)).
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expertise in interpreting the NLRA: "As our decisions consistently
show, we accord great respect to the expertise of the Board when
its conclusions are rationally based on articulated facts and consis-




Justice Brennan, writing for the dissent in Yeshiva,83 argued
to reinstate the Board's decision. The dissent concluded that the
Board's decision was rational and consistent with the NLRA and
therefore should not be subject to judicial review. 4 In particular,
Justice Brennan agreed with the Board's conclusions that the
faculty members were not managerial or supervisory personnel.
The dissent placed considerable significance on the Board's finding
that the faculty "exercised its decisionmaking authority in its own
interest rather than 'in the interest of the employer.' "85 Justice
Brennan reasoned that the majority "fail[ed] fully to discern and
comprehend the nature of the faculty's role in university govern-
82. 444 U.S. at 691 (citation omitted). In dictum, the Court raised some points to limit
its opinion within the university context: "[P]rofessors may not be excluded merely because
they determine the content of their own courses, evaluate their own students, and supervise
their own research. There thus may be institutions of higher learning unlike Yeshiva where
the faculty are entirely or predominantly nonmanagerial. There also may be faculty mem-
bers at Yeshiva and like universities who properly could be included in a bargaining unit. It
may be that a rational line could be drawn between tenured and untenured faculty mem-
bers, depending upon how a faculty is structured and operated. But we express no opinion
on these questions for it is clear that the unit approved by the Board was far too broad." Id.
at 690-91 n.31.
83. Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun joined Justice Brennan in the dissent.
84. "[T]hrough its continuous oversight of industrial conditions, it is the Board that is
best able to formulate and adjust national labor policy to conform to the realities of indus-
trial life. Accordingly, the judicial role is limited; a court may not substitute its own judg-
ment for that of the Board. The Board's decision may be reviewed for its rationality and its
consistency with the Act, but once these criteria are satisfied, the order must be enforced."
444 U.S. at 693-94 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483,
501 (1978).
85. 444 U.S. at 696. "It is no answer to say, as does the Court, that Yeshiva's faculty
and administration are one and the same because their interests tend to coincide. In the
first place, the National Labor Relations Act does not condition its coverage on an antago-
nism of interests between the employer and the employee. The mere coincidence of interests
on many issues has never been thought to abrogate the right to collective bargaining on
those topics as to which that coincidence is absent. Ultimately, the performance of an em-
ployee's duties will always further the interests of the employer, for in no institution do the
interests of labor and management totally diverge." Id. at 700-01.
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ance,"8 6 and that "[t]he Court's conclusion that the faculty's pro-
fessional interests are indistinguishable from those of the adminis-
tration is bottomed on an idealized model of collegial
decisionmaking .... "8 According to Justice Brennan, the very
fact that Yeshiva's faculty voted for union representation indicated
that the interests of the faculty and the administration do not al-
ways coincide. "Indeed, on the precise topics which are specified as
mandatory subjects of collective bargaining-wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment-the interests of
teacher and administrator are often diametrically opposed.""8
The dissenting opinion agreed with the majority's conclusion
that the managerial exclusion was created to obviate the problem
of divided loyalty between management and labor.89 However, the
dissent concluded that divided loyalty was not a problem between
the Yeshiva faculty and administration. Justice Brennan ex-
plained: "[O]nly if the employee is expected to conform to man-
agement policies and is judged by his effectiveness in executing
those policies does the danger of divided loyalties exist." 90 This
was not the case at Yeshiva, where "[flaculty members are judged
by their. . . teaching and scholarship, not on the compatibility of
their advice with administration policy."91
86. Id. at 696. "[W]hatever influence the faculty wields in university decisionmaking is
attributable solely to its collective expertise as professional educators, and not to any mana-
gerial or supervisory prerogatives. . . .[W]hile the administration may attempt to defer to
the faculty's competence whenever possible, it must and does apply its own distinct perspec-
tive to those recommendations, a perspective that is based on fiscal and other managerial
policies which the faculty has no part in developing. The University always retains the ulti-
mate decisionmaking authority. . . and the administration gives what weight and import to
the faculty's collective judgment as it chooses and deems consistent with its own perception
of the institution's needs and objectives." Id. at 697-98 (footnotes and citations omitted).
87. Id. at 702 (emphasis added).
88. Id. See also Newton, Faculty Attitudes and Collective Bargaining in Higher Edu-
cation, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN HIGHER EDUCATION-THE DEVELOPING LAW 109-10
(1975).
89. See text accompanying note 79 supra.
90. 444 U.S. at 699.
91. Id. at 700. "Yeshiva's faculty, however, is not accountable to the administration in
its governance function, nor is any individual faculty member subject to personal sanction
or control based on the administration's assessment of the worth of his recommendations.
When the faculty, through the schools' advisory committees, participates in university deci-
sionmaking on subjects of academic policy, it does not serve as the 'representative of man-
agement.' Unlike industrial supervisors and managers, university professors are not hired to
'make operative' the policies and decisions of their employer. Nor are they retained on the
condition that their interests will correspond to those of the university administration. In-
deed, the notion that a faculty member's professional competence could depend on his
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Analysis of Bell and Yeshiva
The Yeshiva Court's holding rekindles an old controversy and
fuels a new debate. First, Yeshiva demonstrates that the holding in
Bell was overbroad. Second, Yeshiva signals the beginning of a ju-
dicial attitude that threatens to limit the scope of statutory protec-
tion for professionals under section 2(12) of the NLRA 2
The managerial exclusion as defined in Bell arose from the
concern that an employer is entitled to the undivided loyalty of its
representatives.93 Nevertheless, the Court expressly held in Bell
that all managers must be denied NLRA protection even when
union membership would not create a conflict of interest with a
particular manager's job responsibilities. 4 An examination of the
underlying purpose of the managerial exclusion indicates that per
se exclusion of all managers is overbroad.
The Yeshiva decision exemplifies the overbreadth of the Bell
mandate of per se exclusion of all managers. The Yeshiva faculty
members were denied protection under the Act because they were
involved in policymaking.95 No determination was made that the
faculty members were exercising supervisory roles over other em-
ployees,9 and there was no showing that union membership would
create a conflict of interest with faculty members' job responsibili-
ties. In fact, the primary purpose of the managerial exclusion, the
avoidance of divided loyalty between the union and the employer,
was not at issue in Yeshiva. The Supreme Court majority opinion
repeatedly emphasized that the Yeshiva faculty and administra-
tion have the same professional interests. NLRA protection would
not produce divided loyalty because both faculty and administra-
tion have the same goals.9 The Yeshiva faculty was not being
judged on its effectiveness in executing management policy and
thus had no reason to develop divided loyalties.98 As a result, the
Bell mandate of per se exclusion has resulted in the unnecessary
undivided loyalty to management is antithetical to the whole concept of academic free-
dom." Id. at 699-700 (emphasis added).
92. 29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (1976). See notes 61, 65-66 & accompanying text supra.
93. 416 U.S. at 281.
94. Id. at 274-75.
95. 444 U.S. at 686.
96. Id. at 682.
97. "[Tihe faculty's professional interests-as applied to governance at a university
like Yeshiva-cannot be separated from those of the institution." Id. at 689.
98. Id. at 689.
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exclusion of a bargaining unit that in no way furthers the purpose
of preventing divided loyalties.
Another rationale for the managerial exclusion that was pro-
posed by the majority opinion in Bell is that managers must be
excluded from bargaining units in order to protect workers from
management domination of the union.9 9 However, as the facts in
Yeshiva demonstrate, such a concern is not an issue in all manag-
ers' bargaining unit certification petitions. The Yeshiva faculty was
petitioning for a uiit composed-solely of faculty. There was no at-
tempt by the faculty members to interject themselves into a union
representing all of the university employees. 100 Therefore, the
Yeshiva faculty need not have been excluded from NLRA protec-
tion for fear of managerial domination of the "rank-and-file."
In light of Yeshiva, the dissent in Bell warrants reconsidera-
tion. There, Justice White stated that the Bell mandate of per se
exclusion of all managers is too sweeping a measure.101 Only man-
agers who exercise supervisory roles in addition to their managerial
duties, or managers whose membership in a bargaining unit would
cause the manager to be in an untenable position of divided loyalty
between the union and the employer should be excluded from
NLRA protection.
Statutory Protection for Professionals
The Supreme Court holding in Yeshiva threatens the viability
of statutory protection for professionals under section 2(12) of the
NLRA. 10 2 A manager, as defined by the Yeshiva-Bell test,103 "must
99. 416 U.S. at 288-89 n.16.
100. 444 U.S. at 678.
101. "The majority expresses concern that extending organizational and bargaining
rights to managerial employees would permit the extension of the Act to vice presidents and
other high level executives, thereby blurring the distinction between management and labor.
The concern is overblown; for most, if not all, executives will obviously be 'super' supervi-
sors... or within the Board's definition of those employees whose organization would re-
sult in a conflict of interest with respect to the company's labor policies. If there are remain-
ing executives outside these categories who should also be excluded, the Board should be
told to exclude that particular group, rather than to exclude the managerial class that would
reach not only vertically, but laterally, to deny 'hundreds of thousands' of buyers and other
relatively low-level management employees the organizational benefits and other protections
of the Act otherwise available to 'any employee."' 416 U.S. at 307 n.3 (White, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted).
102. 29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (1976). See note 65 & accompanying text supra.
103. See notes 74-75 & accompanying text supra.
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exercise discretion within or even independently of employer pol-
icy.' 1 4 At the same time, professionals who are protected under
section 2(12) of the NLRA10 5 are described as employees who "con-
sistent[lyj exercise .. .discretion and judgment."10 6 These con-
verging definitions present potentially serious problems and will
surely lead to increased litigation. The final result may be that af-
ter Yeshiva more professionals, who by definition exercise discre-
tion in their employment, will be excluded from NLRA protection.
The Yeshiva Court, aware of this overlapping definition,
stated that it was "not suggesting an application of the managerial
exclusion that would sweep all professionals outside the Act in
derogation of Congress' expressed intent to protect them. ' 17 The
Court therefore attempted to establish a standard to be used to
distinguish excluded professional managers from protected profes-
sional employees. Essentially, the standard is derived from five
NLRB decisions that the Court presents as examples of profes-
sional employees who would not be within the managerial exclu-
sion of the Yeshiva-Bell test.10 8 Referring to the employee activi-
ties in these cases, the Court stated: "Only if an employee's
activities fall outside the scope of the duties routinely performed
by similarly situated professionals will he be found aligned with
management."109
A close examination of the "similarly situated professionals"
in the cases cited by the Court indicates that the standard will be
of little help to the lower courts that must deal with the profes-
sional-managerial overlap. Of the five cases cited as support, only
one, General Dynamics Corp.,110 actually involved the managerial
exclusion. The remaining cases' are concerned exclusively with
the statutory exclusion of supervisors. Furthermore, General Dy-
namics primarily involved a managerial-supervisorial hybrid exclu-
sion and therefore is of limited assistance in the application of the
104. 444 U.S. at 683 (emphasis added). See note 75 & accompanying text supra.
105. 29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (1976).
106. See note 65 & accompanying text supra.
107. 444 U.S. at 690.
108. Id. at 690 n.30.
109. Id. at 690.
110. 213 N.L.R.B. 851 (1974).
111. Wurster, Bernardi & Emmons, Inc., 192 N.L.R.B. 1049 (1971); Skidmore, Owings
& Merrill, 192 N.L.R.B. 920 (1971); Doctor's Hosp. of Modesto, Inc., 183 N.L.R.B. 950
(1970), enforced, 489 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1973); National Broadcasting Co., 160 N.L.R.B. 1440
(1966).
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managerial exclusion in future situations involving professional
employees who possess managerial responsibilities but lack super-
visory roles.
The precedential value of General Dynamics is further weak-
ened by its complex factual scenario. Much of the Board's holding
will be difficult to apply to anything other than a systems engi-
neering corporation similar to General Dynamics. At issue in Gen-
eral Dynamics was the bargaining unit status of approximately
eighty-five different employee classifications in the engineering
field. The Board determined that only four classifications of em-
ployees were to be excluded from NLRA protection because of
their purely managerial status. Unfortunately, there does not ap-
pear to be any common denominator among these four jobs that
would assist in future determinations of managerial status.11
Other employee classes were excluded on the basis of combined
managerial and supervisory duties. However, a close examination
of this hybrid exclusion indicates that the Board based its deci-
sions primarily upon the supervisory duties of the employees. 1 3
General Dynamics made no effective attempt to distinguish mana-
gerial professionals from nonmanagerial professionals. Rather, the
Board merely determined that "professional employees plainly are
not the same as management employees ...."I"
The Yeshiva Court's standard thus fails to provide any actual
distinction between managerial and nonmanagerial professionals.
The lower courts will be relegated to applying the ambiguous
Yeshiva-Bell test to determine managerial status. Statutory pro-
tection for professionals thus may be undermined because many
professionals have job responsibilities that easily will fall within
the broad Yeshiva-Bell test. For example, an attorney who has in-
dependent authority to settle a case for a corporate employer is in
a position analogous to that of a buyer with authority to commit
the employer's credit. The NLRB has often categorized such buy-
112. The four job classifications were Administrative Accountant, Senior Equipment
Engineer, Price Estimator, and Senior Quality Assurance Specialist. 213 N.L.R.B. at 860-63.
113. See, e.g., id. at 862. "We have found that 'project leaders' in certain classifica-
tions exhibit, or appear to exhibit, managerial and/or supervisorial indicia in addition to
their roles as project leaders, and have excluded them specifically. So it is here with regard
to Senior Manufacturing and Development Engineer Kolbricht, who regularly substitutes
as departmental supervisor during the absences of that supervisor." Id. (emphasis added).
114. Id. at 857.
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ers as managers.115 Therefore, attorneys may find that any attempt
at unionization may be thwarted by the Yeshiva-Bell test for ex-
clusion of managers.11  Similarly, doctors often participate in hos-
pital policymaking, which may warrant their exclusion from NLRA
protection under the Yeshiva-Bell test. Other professional groups,
including symphony orchestras,117 also have employee participation
patterns strikingly similar to those at Yeshiva and ostensibly are
excluded from NLRA protection under the Yeshiva-Bell test.
The Yeshiva-Bell Impact Upon Other University Faculties and
Other Professional Groups
The Court contended in Yeshiva that its holding was meant to
be applied only to a Yeshiva-type faculty.1 " However, the Court
neglected to note that Yeshiva's division of authority between its
administration and faculty is quite common among four-year pri-
vate universities.119 Therefore, the impact of Yeshiva upon other
115. See, e.g., Grocers Supply Co., 160 N.L.R.B. 485, 488 (1966); W.W. Chambers Co.,
124 N.L.R.B. 984, 988 (1959); Curtiss-Wright Corp., 103 N.L.R.B. 458, 464 (1953); Wise,
Smith & Co., 83 N.L.R.B. 1019, 1021 (1949). *
116. See generally Comment, The Unionization of Attorneys, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 100,
106 (1971).
117. See notes 128-48 & accompanying text infra.
118. 444 U.S. at 690-91 n.31.
119. The Yeshiva case prompted parties on both sides of the issues to submit amicus
briefs to the Court. Briefs urging reversal were submitted by the American Association of
University Professors, the National Education Association, and the American Federation of
Teachers. Briefs urging affirmance were submitted by the National Society of Professional
Engineers aid Trustees of Boston University and by the Johns Hopkins University, New
York University, Northeastern University, and The George Washington University. The ad-
ministrations of the four latter universities combined their efforts into one brief.
Although the various briefs espoused various points of view, they were unanimous on
one point: the authority structure of Yeshiva University could be found at other universi-
ties. For example, the amicus brief submitted on behalf of The Johns Hopkins University,
New York University, Northeastern University, and The George Washington University
presented an analysis of the governing structures of their own universities and concluded
that "[w]hile each campus has its own unique history and traditions, they share a common
recognition of the integral role of faculty in their decision-making processes." Brief for
Amici Curiae at 3, NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980). See also Brief for National
Society of Professional Engineers at 9, NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980): "The
Amicus submits that the status and responsibilities of Yeshiva's faculty members are typical
of those of faculty members at mature universities generally." For a comparison study of
faculty collective bargaining contracts, with numerous examples of faculties structured simi-
larly to the Yeshiva University faculty, see Brief for Amicus, American Association of Uni-
versity Professors, at app., NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
Numerous commentators have described the powerful private university faculties that
have substantial input in hiring, firing, tenure, and curriculum decisions. See, e.g., R. Cmm
[Vol. 32
universities is potentially far-reaching.
Yeshiva creates uncertainty for other private universities. The
Court held that a case by case analysis should be the method of
determining future cases. 120 Consequently, a question of fact will
arise in each case as to whether the particular faculty sufficiently
comports with the three-part Yeshiva-Bell test.121 This uncertainty
works to the disadvantage of university faculty and gives univer-
sity administrations an additional method for forestalling faculty
unionization. After Yeshiva, more university administrations are
likely to raise the objection at the faculty unit certification pro-
ceeding that the faculty unit is inappropriate because of its mana-
gerial status. If the Board rejects this proposition, the administra-
tion can then refuse to bargain, thus forcing the faculty to initiate
the lengthy process of filing an unfair labor practice charge with
the NLRB. 12 2 Even if the faculty members eventually prevail at
the appellate level, they have been forced to engage in unwanted,
protracted litigation.
Yeshiva will likely also affect those institutions that presently
do not have a faculty authority structure that satisfies the three-
part Yeshiva-Bell test. '2  The decision in Yeshiva in effect will
force faculties that presently do not have a significant degree of
policymaking authority to choose between NLRA protection and
increased policymaking authority. If as a faculty gains more policy-
making authority it is thereby designated "managerial" under the
Yeshiva-Bell test, the incentive for faculties to participate more in
university governance is lost. Thus, if the faculties choose to re-
main safely within the ambit of the NLRA, the unique policy-
making contribution that these faculties could make to the better-
ment of their institutions would be lost because of Yeshiva.
If other university faculties are found to be managerial in fu-
ture cases, the NLRB's jurisdiction over higher education will be
severely eroded. Congress expressly granted the NLRB broad dis-
& D. VAN EYCK, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING COMES TO THE CAMPUS (1973); J. CORSON, THE
GOVERNANCE OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES (1975); F. KEmERER & J. BALDRIDGE, UNIONS ON
CAMPUS (1975); THE CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION, GOVERNANCE OF HIGHER
EDUCATION (1973); Hueppe, Private University. St. John's, in FACULTY UNIONS AND COLLEC-
TIVE BARGAINING 175 (E. Duryea ed. 1973); Mortimer & Lozier, Contracts of Four-Year In-
stitutions, in FACULTY UNIONS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 108 (E. Duryea ed. 1973).
120. 444 U.S. at 690-91 n.31.
121. See notes 74-75 & accompanying text supra.
122. See notes 8, 46 supra.
123. See notes 74-75 & accompanying text supra.
January 1981] NLRB v. YESHIVA UNIVERSITY
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
cretion to adjudicate labor relations in fields affecting interstate
commerce.1 1 4 By erosion of that jurisdiction, the Court has virtu-
ally created its own amendment to the Act. Therefore, while seem-
ingly dealing -with the limited issue of whether Yeshiva's faculty
members were managers, the Court has actually supplanted Con-
gress' power to delegate authority to the NLRB. In addition, al-
though public institutions of higher education are not directly af-
fected by Yeshiva, 25 public sector bargaining laws are largely
patterned after the NLRA.12 6 Therefore, Yeshiva's holding that
managerial status can be found in certain private higher education
faculties may eventually filter through to the public sector.
Although Yeshiva addressed a collective bargaining unit deter-
mination issue in the context of higher education, Bell's manager-
ial definition, as reaffirmed and "clarified" by Yeshiva, stands as
precedent for the managerial exclusion in other employment set-
tings. There is no language in either Bell or Yeshiva that limits the
managerial definition to particular potential bargaining units.
Thus, any professional group that is involved in its employer's pol-
icy decisions is ripe for the managerial exclusion under Bell and
Yeshiva. It is possible that attorneys, doctors, and others may soon
find themselves excluded from NLRA protection. 27
124. See note 8 supra.
125. See note 6 supra.
126. See generally Alleyne, Instituting Collective Bargaining at California's Univer-
sities and Colleges: The Outlines of HEERA, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 563 (1980). California's
Higher Education Employer-Employee Relations Act anticipated the "Yeshiva" problem by
specifically asserting jurisdiction over public university and college faculty members. CAL.
Gov'T CODE § 3561(b) (West 1980).
127. See note 116 & accompanying text supra. The NLRB first asserted jurisdiction
over private law firms in Foley, Hoag & Eliot, 229 N.L.R.B. 456 (1977), and over publicly
funded legal services corporations in Legal Serv. for N. Pa., 220 N.L.R.B. 668 (1977). The
Board stated in Camden Regional Legal Serv. Corp., Inc., 231 N.L.R.B. 224 (1977), that it
will decline jurisdiction over law firms whose annual gross revenues do not exceed $250,000.
See generally Sipser, The Performing Arts and Nonprofit Legal Organizations, in APPRO-
PRATE UNTS FOR CoLLECTI BARGAINING 337-90 (P.G. Nash ed. 1979). Congress expressly
extended NLRA protection to nonprofit hospitals in the 1974 NLRA amendments, Pub. L.
No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395 (1974) (amending 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(2), (14)). See generally Keaton
& Koeffler, The Hospital Industry, in APPROPRIATE UNTrS FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 165-
250b (P.G. Nash ed. 1979).
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An Example of Yeshiva's and Bell's Impact
Outside the Scope of Higher Education:
Symphony Orchestras
One professional group that has employee decisionmaking par-
ticipation analogous to the participation of university faculty in
university governance is symphony orchestra musicians. An exami-
nation of the power structure of symphony orchestras' indicates
how the Yeshiva-Bell test may be applied outside the field of
higher education.128
The history of orchestras has a remarkable resemblance to
that of universities. The "collegial" origins of universities dates
from the Middle Ages, when universities were essentially a convo-
cation of scholars, and an administrative bureaucracy did not ex-
ist.129 Similarly, until the 19th century, orchestras were usually led
by the principal first violinist, the concertmaster, who was essen-
tially "first among equals." In the 19th century, however, orches-
tras witnessed the development of the tyrannical conductor who
was clearly in a position of dominance over the players. The era of
the dictatorial conductor, hiring and firing at will, in turn gave way
to the present system of carefully drafted collective bargaining
agreements in which symphony players have a substantial voice in
hiring, firing, and working conditions.130 Although symphony
orchestra members clearly fall within the NLRA's definition of
"professionals," ' it is possible that they also are within the
Yeshiva-Bell test for managers.3 2
Although no two orchestras have identical collective bargain-
ing agreements, there does exist a policymaking structure common
to most American orchestras. Most orchestras utilize a "players'
committee" consisting of representatives of the orchestra, serving
much the same function as faculty committees at universities.183
128. The NLRB asserted jurisdiction over symphony orchestras in 1972. 38 Fed. Reg.
6176-77 (1973) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 103.2 (1979)). Jurisdiction was limited to those
orchestras whose gross annual revenue exceeded $1,000,000. This is the same standard as is
used for private colleges and universities. See note 13 supra.
129. See text accompanying note 87 supra.
130. See generally H. SCHOENBERG, THE GREAT CoNDuCTORs (1963).
131. See note 65 supra.
132. See notes 74-75 & accompanying text supra.
133. Present bargaining units in orchestras consist of all the orchestra members. If the
dictum in Yeshiva, see note 82 supra, is followed, the Board or a reviewing court might
make a distinction between the "managerial" orchestra committee members and the "rank-
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For purposes of illustration, this Note discusses three orchestras"'
in which the players' committees have varying degrees of control:
the San Diego Symphony, which has an extremely player-oriented
collective bargaining agreement;"3 ' the San Francisco Symphony,
which has a collective bargaining agreement weighted slightly to-
wards management;13 6 and the Los Angeles Philharmonic Orches-
and-fie" remainder of the orchestra. This could have a deleterious effect. Orchestra mem-
bers might try to avoid membership on orchestra committees in order to save their "rank-
and-file" status and remain protected by the NLRA. This potentially would wreak havoc on
the infrastructure of orchestras, because the active participation of players on orchestra
committees is what keeps many orchestras functioning effectively.
134. All three orchestras have gross annual revenues exceeding $1,000,000, thereby
bringing them within the Board's jurisdiction. See note 128 supra.
135. To obtain a position with the San Diego Symphony, a musician must perform an
audition before a committee consisting of the orchestra's Music Director and the orchestra
members who are the principals of the orchestra section the auditioner wishes to join. The
highly unusual aspect of San Diego's audition committee is that the Music Director and
each principal player has an equal vote. At the preliminary audition, a simple majority of
affirmative votes will advance an applicant to the final round of auditions. In the final round
of auditions, each committee member, including the Music Director, has an equal voice in
ranking the applicants on a scaled system of points. The auditioner obtaining the highest
score is offered the position. In case of a tie, the Music Director chooses from among the
tied applicants.
San Diego's orchestra members also have an unusually large degree of authority in
firing decisions. There is a players' review committee consisting of nine members of the
orchestra. Eight of these members are chosen by the orchestra members from the various
orchestra sections. The ninth member is chosen by these eight, but this ninth member must
be acceptable to management. The Music Director does not sit on the players' review com-
mittee. Nonrenewal of a player's contract is initiated by the Music Director, who meets with
the affected player. The player is then "given every opportunity to correct his alleged defi-
ciencies and the Music Director [must] give serious reconsideration to the matter." If the
Music Director is still determined to terminate the player's contract, the player then has the
right to appeal the decision to the players' review committee. The nine-member review com-
mittee votes on whether to retain the orchestra member. A simple majority vote is final and
binding. Further protection is offered to the players by means of two unusual contract
clauses: (1) nonrenewals are limited to 10% of the membership per year, and; (2) if the
committee votes not to fire a member, management is prohibited from reinitiating the pro-
cedure the following year. See Master Agreement between San Diego Symphony Orchestra
Association and Musicians Association of San Diego .Local 325, American Federation of
Musicians (1976-1979) (on file with the Hastings Law Journal).
136. The San Francisco Symphony has a ten-member audition committee, whose
membership is drawn from the ranks of the orchestra. Five members are chosen by manage-
ment and five are chosen by the orchestra players. The Music Director does not participate
in the preliminary or semifinal rounds of auditions. During the preliminary round, each
committee member casts a "yes-no" vote. Any auditioner who receives six or more "yes"
votes proceeds to the semifinal round. The semifinals proceed in the same fashion; any audi-
tioner who receives six or more "yes" votes proceeds to the final round of auditions. The
auditions committee does not participate in the finals. The Music Director has sole discre-
tion to choose anyone who has reached this round of judging. The Director even has the
option of not choosing anyone.
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The decision in Yeshiva appears to have turned on the reason-
ing that the interests of the faculty and the interests of the admin-
istration could not be separated and that the administration and
the faculty were both interested in building and perpetuating the
quality of the institution."8 The same could be said of an orches-
tra. A musician's working life and professional reputation, like a
professor's, is enhanced by being employed by an efficiently func-
tioning, esteemed institution. This identity of interests could lead
the NLRB or a court to hold that orchestra members are "aligned
with management." Each of the three orchestras provides some
means of player participation in personnel decisions. This could
lead a court to conclude that the players are "formulating and ef-
fectuating" the employer's policies and that they are "exercising
discretion" within, or even independently of, employer policy.
Thus, it is very possible that orchestra members could be viewed
as "managers" under the Yeshiva-Bell test and therefore excluded
San Francisco's nonrenewal committee comprises ten orchestra members, half chosen
by management and half by the orchestra. Nonrenewal of a player's contract is initiated by
the Music Director who notifies the affected player. The player has the option of resigning
or bringing the case to the nonrenewal committee. The committee first meets with the Mu-
sic Director for purposes of discussion only. If the Director is still determined to terminate
the player's contract, the committee takes a "yes-no" vote. If five or more of the ten-mem-
ber committee agrees with the Director that the player's contract should not be renewed,
the player's contract is terminated and there is no right of appeal. If six or more committee
members vote not to terminate the contract, the Music Director still has the right to termi-
nate, but the player is entitled to appeal the decision under established grievance proce-
dures set out in the contract. See San Francisco Symphony Orchestra Agreement between
the San Francisco Symphony Association and Local 6, American Federation of Musicians
(1978-1981) (on file with the Hastings Law Journal).
137. The Los Angeles Philharmonic auditions committee consists of seven orchestra
members chosen by the orchestra. Unlike the San Diego Symphony and the San Francisco
Symphony, however, the committee's function is purely advisory. The collective bargaining
agreement states that the Music Director "shall give serious consideration to the views of"
the committee, but final decisions rest with the Music Director.
The auditions committee also serves as the firing committee. In firing decisions, how-
ever, the seven committee members each have an actual vote. The Music Director has three
votes. A simple majority vote for or against nonrenewal is dispositive. If there is a tie vote, a
second ballot is taken and here, the Music Director has four votes. The result of this second
vote is final. See Master Agreement between the Los Angeles Philharmonic Association and
Local 47, American Federation of Musicians (1978-1981) (on file with the Hastings Law
Journal). See generally Hanson, International Conference of Symphony & Orchestra Musi-
cians, Nonrenewal and Audition Procedures (1979) (unpublished survey) (on file with the
Hastings Law Journal).
138. See text accompanying note 78 supra.
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from NLRA protection. 89
In some cases a convincing argument that the orchestra mem-
bers are not managers may not be possible. In San Diego, where
the players have an equal vote with the Music Director in hiring
and firing decisions,140 it is highly unlikely that the application of
Bell and Yeshiva could be avoided. Through their representatives'
voting rights, the players both "formulate and effectuate" the em-
ployer's policies and "exercise discretion" within, or even indepen-
dently of, employer policy. They therefore could easily be consid-
ered to be "aligned with management."4
Were.the Yeshiva-Bell test applied to the San Francisco Sym-
phony, the outcome would not be as certain. The players have a
significant voice, but the Music Director makes the ultimate deci-
sion in both hiring and firing, except in cases in which a nonre-
newal dispute is taken to an outside arbitrator.142 This situation is
similar to Yeshiva, where the professors' input was solicited, but
the deans, administration, and Board of Trustees had ultimate
veto power over hiring and firing decisions. Whether the players in
the San Francisco Symphony would be considered managerial
would depend upon whether the Music Director usually agrees
with the preferences of the players' committee. In Yeshiva, the Su-
preme Court gave great weight to the fact that faculty recommen-
dations were rarely overturned by the deans, administrators, or
Board of Trustees. 43 In the San Francisco Symphony, the commit-
tees and the Music Director often agree on personnel decisions.
14
4
Consequently under the Yeshiva-Bell test, this accord could prove
fatal to the existence of the musicians' union that is presently op-
erating under NLRA protection.
The Los Angeles Philharmonic would be the most likely of the
139. A Yeshiva-type controversy, however, would likely only reach the Board or a re-
viewing court if the orchestra's administration initiated the proceeding. It is highly unlikely
that the players would be arguing that they did not want NLRA protection. Therefore, in an
orchestra where the administration was satisfied with the status quo, even if the players had
"managerial" powers, the administration would not go before the Board and the players
would retain NLRA protection. It also is likely that the Board will apply the Yeshiva-Bell
test as sparingly as possible, as the Board disagreed with the outcome of Yeshiva.
140. See note 135 supra.
141. See notes 74-75 & accompanying text supra.
142. See note 136 supra.
143. See note 64 & accompanying text supra.
144. Telephone interview with San Francisco Symphony Personnel Manager (July 14,
1980).
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three orchestras to escape a finding that its members are "manag-
ers" under the Yeshiva-Bell test. In both hiring and firing, the
Music Director's decision is, for all intents and purposes, the one
that prevails. 145 However, the Los Angeles Philharmonic is envied
by other orchestras for the high level of cooperation that exists be-
tween its players and its administration. 4 Therefore, as with the
San Francisco Symphony,. this very atmosphere of accord could
lead a court to hold that the Los Angeles Philharmonic players are
"aligned with management."
The Supreme Court emphasized that universities will have to
be examined on a case by case basis to determine if Yeshiva ap-
plies.1 47 Such is also the case with orchestras. However, from the
representative sampling shown, it is highly likely that the Yeshiva-
Bell test could be applied to a large number of orchestras. The
successful use of the NLRA-protected collective bargaining mecha-
nism has been a factor in maintaining relatively stable labor re-
lations among symphony orchestra members and their manage-
ments. 4" If orchestra members are denied NLRA protection
because of the Yeshiva-Bell test, the stability that has been so
painstakingly achieved might be destroyed.
Conclusion
The net effect of the Supreme Court decisions in Yeshiva and
Bell is that an increased number of employees in higher education
and other fields may be denied collective bargaining rights. It is
true that Yeshiva did not deprive the faculty of its right to union-
ize. However, the right to unionize is virtually worthless if it is not
accompanied by NLRA protection. A unionized employee who is
excluded from NLRA protection could be fired for union participa-
tion. Without the NLRA, such an employee has no legal redress.1 49
145. See note 137 supra. The only scenario in which the Music Director's opinion
would not prevail would be in the unlikely situation where six out of seven committee mem-
bers agreed that the player should not be fired, but the Music Director concluded that the
player should be fired.
146. Telephone interview with Director, Association of California Symphony Orches-
tras (July 17, 1980).
147. 444 U.S. at 690-91 n.31.
148. Admittedly, various orchestras have gone on strike despite their participation in
NLRA-protected collective bargaining. It is arguable, however, that NLRA protection has
kept these strikes to a minimum.
149. See Comment, The Appropriate Faculty Bargaining Unit in Private Colleges
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The Supreme -Court stated in Yeshiva that it was not ruling
on the merits of faculty collective bargaining. The Court deter-
mined that this particular issue is more appropriately left to Con-
gress. 150  However, the Court's holding in essence deprives
Yeshiva's faculty of its collective bargaining rights. The practical
result would have been no different if the Court had ruled nega-
tively on the merits of faculty collective bargaining. This is an un-
fortunate result. Faculty collective bargaining is a complex and
controversial issue15 ' and a thorough policy analysis of its benefits
and burdens is better left to Congress.
152
and Universities, 59 VA. L. Rnv. 492, 505 n.62 (1973).
150. 444 U.S. at 689-90 n.29.
151. Compare Kahn, The NLRB and Higher Education: The Failure of Policymaking
Through Adjudication, 21 U.C.L.A. L. Rnv. 63 (1973), with Finkin, The NLRB in Higher
Education, 5 U. TOL. L. REv. 608 (1974); compare Mintz, Faculty Collective Bargaining in
Higher Education: A Management Perspective, 3 J.L. & EDUC. 413 (1974), with Wollett,
Faculty Collective Bargaining in Higher Education: An Organization Perspective, 3 J.L. &
EDUc. 425 (1974), and Finkin, Faculty Collective Bargaining in Higher Education: An In-
dependent Perspective, 3 J.L. & EDuc. 439 (1974).
152. In response to Yeshiva, H.R. 7619, known as the "AAUP Bill" (American Associ-
ation of University Professors), was introduced in Congress. The bill provides "that no
faculty member or group of faculty members in any educational institution shall be deemed
to be managerial or supervisory employees solely because the faculty member or group of
faculty members participate in decisions with respect to courses, curriculum, personnel, or
other matters of educational policy." H.R. 7619, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 96 CONG. REc. 5230
(1980).
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